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ABSTRACT 
This study attempts to explain the pattern and evolution of economic development in Malaysia since 
independence. It focuses on the impact of growth and analyses how the government policy of positive discrimination (also 
known as Bumiputeras) has helped to address historical backwardness and thus reduce ethnic tensions in the country. The 
state also launched the policy of diversification, which involved various combinations of policy initiatives; for instance, the 
expansion of new industries was encouraged, especially if they focused on production for foreign markets. As a result, job 
opportunities increased. The government also undertook measures to tackle rural poverty, modest land reforms, protection 
of tenant rights, and other rural development measures to protect the rural poor. All these measures to a certain extent 
helped to reduce rural poverty.  
This paper offers an explanation as to how the net implications for employment and growth have been achieved. I 
think this study is important because a review of Malaysia’s economic strategies and development could be a very useful 
example for other developing countries. The key finding of the study is that the state has to a great extent been successful 
in its role and objective of promoting economic and social development in Malaysia. However, the economic strategy that 
is based on export markets and credits to provide the stimulus for growth may likely encounter difficulties due to increased 
competition unleashed by the forces of globalisation. These difficulties could arise despite evidence on trends in economic 
growth and employment creation which suggest that Malaysia’s recent transition to a high-growth trajectory has been 
accompanied by low inflation and decreased levels of unemployment and poverty.  
KEYWORDS: Malaysia, Export-Led Growth, Diversification, Islam, State Intervention, FDI, and Ethnic Relations. 
INTRODUCTION 
This study will focus on the post-independent period, when the government took strategic decisions to move 
production from low value to higher value products. Currently, Malaysia is the second fastest growing economy in the 
South East Asian region with an average Gross National Product (GNP) growth of eight-plus percent per year since 2000. 
In 2010, Malaysia’s gross domestic production was US$ 235.2 billion, with GDP per capita (PPP) equal to US$ 14,564 
with major industries including electronics, petroleum, chemicals, textiles, palm oil, timber and tourism. (World Bank, 
2011; Economic Report, 2011)  
 Together with a stable political environment, increasing per capita income and the potential for further regional 
integration throughout the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Malaysia is an attractive prospect for FDI 
(foreign direct investment). Decades of industrial growth have made the country one of the most vibrant and successful 
economy of the South-East Asia. The aim of this article is to identify and to critically analyse the factors that contributed 
towards this rapid economic growth.  
There have been a number of studies on economic development in Malaysia (i). However,  new developments such 
as globalisation and the expansion of export sectors as seen in China and Vietnam will most likely bring a new dimension 
of competition and challenges for growing export sectors in particular and economic growth in general in the near future. 
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Also for a country with a multi-ethnic population and past ethnic tension that has done relatively well during the last two 
decades Malaysia may provide important lessons and serve as a model for many other developing countries. A review of 
relevant literature shows that there is noted a lack of discussion on these particular issues (Hamilton and Gereffi, 2009; 
Khoo, 2003).  
This paper will examine the class structure in the colonial and post-colonial period, tracing the development of 
capitalism and its implications for the political economy of the country. For instance, the rubber plantation was entirely the 
creation of British capital (Jomo, 1998; Junid, 1980).   
I think this study is important because a review of Malaysia’s economic strategies and development could be a 
very useful example for other developing countries. The Malaysian experience offers an interesting lesson for a developing 
country as to how government policies could be used to promote domestic businesses. It demonstrates the need to 
formulate industrial policies making use of market and government intervention to turn markets to favour government 
opted policies.  
How did all this happen? How was Malaysia able to transform itself from a colonial backwater to an economic 
powerhouse? How did a multi-racial and multi-religious society with a history of racial tensions, and even bloody racial 
riots in 1964, transform into a peaceful, productive and politically and economically secure society? 
This paper is composed of several sections. After the introduction, the colonial economy will be discussed, 
followed by an analysis of post-independent economic policies. In the third section the importance of foreign capital in the 
economy will be examined, while the fourth section examines the issues of promotion of Malay capitalism. The fifth 
section analysis Malaysia in the context of the East Asian debate. Finally, the relationship between Islam and capitalism 
are discussed, followed by the conclusion.  
Malaysia gained independence from Britain in 1957. It was largely inhabited by three ethnic groups: namely 
Malays, Chinese and Indians, which have different ethnic origins, each with their own culture and identity. More than a 
quarter of Malaysia’s (ii) population is Chinese and they have historically played an important role in trade and business. 
Those of Indian descent comprise about 7% of the population. The process of building the new independent country has 
been a challenging and difficult task of creating social harmony in a multicultural society inherited from a colonial past, 
while at the same time pursuing prosperity and modernisation. 
Modern race relations in Malaysia are a by-product of British colonisation of the peninsula in the late 19th century. 
Racial antagonism and ethnic divisions developed during the colonial administration. Prior to colonisation inter-ethnic 
relations among the people were marked by cultural stereotyping. British colonial policies initiated an unrestricted 
immigration policy and their policies of “divide and rule” did little to support a positive environment of cohesion among 
various ethnic groups in the country (Hirschman, 1986). Soon the colonial administration realised that huge financial gains 
could be made with the expansion of tin mining and cash crop cultivation due to a favourable climate; along with the 
exploitation of huge natural resources (such as timber, minerals etc.). For this purpose, a large number of Chinese, Indian 
and Indonesian labourers were invited to work and settle in the western regions of the country. 
At the end of the Second World War the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) was formed by the 
Malay aristocrats. The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) was also formed in 1949 by the wealthiest Chinese business 
people to ensure their economic interests. The Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) was established in 1946. Malaysia 
inherited a colonial administration and economy largely geared towards producing primary commodities for exportsiii). At 
the time of independence Malay workers accounted for nearly 52 % of the workforce, mostly involved in traditional and 
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low income agricultural sector, while the Chinese formed about 37 % of the population, but engaged in modern economic 
sectors such banking, trade, plantation management etc. This study will also analyse the government policy of positive 
discrimination also known as Bumiputera (iv), which was aimed to address historical backwardness and thus reduce ethnic 
violence and injustice in the country. Thus, in post-independence, the country faced enormous challenges to achieve 
economic growth while preserving communal harmony and balance economic activities between various ethnic groups. On 
the economic front, the availability of huge natural resources such as timber, water and minerals for the manufacturing 
sector could be sustained.  
Malaysia, gradually adopted an export oriented policy and various protective measures were gradually removed. 
For instance between 1970 and 1987, the corporate tax rate of protection on industrial chemicals was reduced from 160% 
to 16%, fertilizers 300% to 8% and tobacco from 125% to 26%, while at the same time those firms who were exclusively 
set up for exports and were provided financial incentives such as protection rates increased from 28% to 131% (Rasiah and 
Shari, 2001). Since 1989, the rapid increase in growth rates, especially in the export sector led to the dramatic expansion in 
the construction and property boom, fuelled by short term bank loans favoured by the financial sector over the longer term 
risky loans given to industrial projects. This was coupled with an inward flow of foreign saving and already high domestic 
savings, which accelerated further the rate of capital accumulation. Besides these factors, businesses and banks also 
borrowed heavily from abroad - thus further increasing the availability of capital in the domestic markets. With Malaysia’s 
adoption of the Banking and Financial Act of 1989, the regulatory control was tightened. As a consequence, the monetary 
and banking policies were proved to be better prepared to face the subsequent financial crisis compared to other East Asian 
neighbours. However, in order to develop the stock markets, the government relied on market-friendly policies. Thus, the 
country’s vulnerability arose from the vitality of international capital flows into stock market.  The government abandoned 
capital controls on financial flows.  
Therefore, at the time of the financial crisis it was mainly equity not debt that was the problem. This meant that 
the economy became hostage to the ‘portfolio investors’ confidence. Any move to undermine their confidence would lead 
to instability and negatively affect stock market growth, which in fact happened in Malaysia in 1997.  
Malaysia introduced capital control measures to stabilise the economy, which was seen as a rejection of IMF’s 
pro-market policies. The impact of financial crisis became worse by the imposition of austerity policies. The crisis of 1997 
indicated that the country’s economic boom of early 1990s was based on weak and shaky grounds and could not be 
sustained. The growth was largely reliant on overseas supply of capital, highly skilled labour and technology.  
Commenting on the 1997 East Asian crisis Joseph Stiglitz (2001) argues that besides the “institutional” 
weaknesses such as poor banking regulation and lack of transparency, these factors alone cannot provide a full explanation 
of the crisis.  
For instance, foreign borrowing by non-financial corporations was made possible by the capital account 
liberalization, and these policies were encouraged by the IMF and the World Bank (v) and led to a build up of short-term 
dollar-dominated debts. The fact is that the credit rating agencies did not downgrade the East Asian countries until after the 
onset of the crisis, but suddenly started doing so only after the crisis was underway.  
Researchers have argued that the property price bubble in South East Asia has its roots in Japanese business 
model, policies and culture, which comprises relations between the sate and businesses, involving rent seeking behaviour. 
Thus, elimination of such practices is claimed to contribute to levelling the playing field and bringing convergence towards 
Anglo-American business model (vi).   
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THE COLONIAL LEGACY 
During British colonial rule the economy was built around the production of rubber and tin. The colonial 
government encouraged specialisation in these products as primary export commodities and Malaysia (then known as 
Malaya) became the major world producer of them. Infrastructural developments in the form of ports, railways, roads, 
electricity etc. were developed to support the investment in rubber plantations and tin mines that ultimately made attractive 
and profitable returns for British investors. But it is worth noting that such capitalist expansion in agriculture was lopsided 
and uneven. As a result, ethnic Malays remained largely marginal to the growing capitalist sector. The colonial 
administration adopted a policy framework that turned the country into the supplier of raw materials and an importer of 
manufactured goods.   
The colonial policy also encouraged the Chinese, Indian and Indonesian immigrants to work in the areas of 
plantation labour and administration. Despite the huge number of immigrants who settled in the country, there was hardly 
any interaction between the different ethnic groups. The Chinese were mainly engaged in the cities and in economic 
activities like tin mining, commerce and trade, while the Indians settled and worked in semi-rural plantations. The Malays 
overwhelmingly lived in the rural areas and worked in the agricultural sector (Gomez and Jomo, 1999:10). Moreover, 
Chinese people migrated to Malaysia in large numbers during the colonial period and formed intra-ethnic partnership in 
business. These Chinese businessmen found it easy to do business deals with other Chinese. Thus, during the colonial 
period the ethnic Malay population was hardly involved in business enterprises. The colonial administration perhaps saw 
the wisdom in keeping the native Malay population in agricultural sector, in a form of divide and conquer through class 
and ethnic segregation. 
The ethnic communities were thus segregated geographically, economically and socially from the local 
population. Mining and rubber plantations were completely populated by Chinese and Indians, while Malays were 
encouraged to remain within subsistence agriculture. The colonial administration initiated a capitalist economy at much 
larger scales in urban and industrial centres, but maintained Malay social structure in the rural areas. Through these 
policies, the British rulers reaped enormous economic benefits (vii). During the late 19th century with European economic, 
military and political domination over the Southeast Asian regions, the need for justification of colonial rule was 
‘discovered’ through the so-called “racial superiority” theory. This in turn led to the propaganda of the myth that caste the 
natives as being lazy. This stereotype was created on the back of the unwillingness of the Malay to work for British mining 
and cash plantation companies and businesses. The reason seems to be very logical, given the terms of employment; i.e. 
low wages and harsh working conditions offered by British companies relative to potential higher earnings that could be 
made in traditional sectors such as agriculture and fishing. Given the availability of abundant fish and natural resources, the 
Malays made the economically rational choice (Hirschman, 1986). 
Hirschman (1986) also characterises Malaysia with the following words: “Nineteenth century colonial society was 
modelled on racial principles: belonging to the dominant white upper caste provided one with prestige and power largely 
independent of one’s personal capabilities. A strict ritual was introduced and maintained, by force when necessary, to 
preserve the white caste from contracts with Asiatic on the basis of equality and to maintain the former’s prestige as the 
dominant group” (Hirschman, 1986:354). The colonial policy of controlling trade, mining and plantations played 
exclusively into the European hands in the late 19th century, and removed any chances of creating Malay entrepreneurship. 
Moreover, to become a successful business in the growing capitalist economy required capital, labour and land and these 
were generally in the hands of the Europeans and Chinese.  
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Therefore, the most notable impact of colonialism has been on the Malaysian economy and society such as the 
creation of a multi-ethnic society with the arrival of huge number of Chinese and Indians immigrants. The economy was 
modified to suit the needs of British imperial interest by specialising the periphery towards primary products - i.e. mining 
and plantation. As a result, during the colonial period the development of an indigenous bourgeoisie was hindered.  
The Malaysian economy grew fast as the international demand for tin and rubber increased, which was mostly 
controlled by the British, with the Chinese control being only a very small proportion. The rubber industry was a very 
profitable investment and investors received very high returns. For instance, in 1910 companies paid dividends ranging 
from 225% to 375% (Bach, 1975). By 1940, about 93% of the British capital investment in Malaysia was in plantation and 
mines (Junid, 1980:18). Almost all British capital investment was limited to plantations and mines, with none in 
manufacturing, food production or consumer goods. For instance, European companies controlled 60% of tin output, while 
remaining 40% into Chinese hands. Similarly, in rubber plantation, 83% was owned British and 14% was owned by 
Chinese (Junid, 1980). 
POST-INDEPENDENT POLICES  
Upon gaining independence in 1957 from Britain, the Malaysian economy was largely based on a handful of 
agricultural and mineral exports and the ethnic Malay people largely worked in areas of low productivity and poverty was 
widespread among them. The government ensured that the policy of redistribution was not at the cost of long-term 
economic growth and the Malaysian consensus created a developmental state with an aim to address the historical 
shortcomings and tackle backwardness among the largest racial groups. The rural population had until then been neglected 
with regards to education and modernisation. Primary and secondary education in rural areas were therefore expanded and 
made available with a view to rectifying historical imbalances that had occurred during the British colonial period.  
Table 1 below shows that the gross domestic product grew by an average of 7% per annum between 1960 and 
2010, except in 1998. During 1998 due to the financial crisis affecting the whole region there was a dramatic fall in growth 
rates, which I will elaborate later on in this article. One remarkable feature of Malaysia’s development is the steady growth 
in domestic savings as indicated in Table 1. The export of goods and services has fluctuated between 1961 and 2010. For 
example, it has risen initially, but sharply fell during the East Asian crisis, but again began to rise during the post- crisis 
period. Despite the current global economic slowdown, Malaysia’s economy remains strong. Macro-economic indicators 
are shown in the figures 1. 
Table 1: Malaysia: Key Macroeconomic Variables (%) 
  1961 1970 1980 1989 1991 1996 1998 2000 2005 2006 2010 
GDP growth rates 7.6 6 7.4 9.2 8.7 8.8 -7.4 8.9 5.4 5.9 5.7 
Gross domestic  savings 
(% of GDP) 
21.1 24.3 29.8 29 28.4 36 48.7 47.3 43.5 41.8 41 
Gross capital formation 
(% of GDP) 
16.1 17.1 27.4 23.5 37.8 41.5 26.7 27.3 19.9 18.7 18.1 
Exports of goods & 
services (annual % 
growth) 
5.5 5 3.2 15.2 15.8 9.2 0.5 16.1 8.6 5.5 6.7 
Imports of goods & 
services (annual % growth 
4.6 17.1 20.5 25.7 25.2 4.9 -19 24.4 8 5 6.2 
Source: World Bank – National accounts data, OECD national accounts data (2 & 3), Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook, Malaysia. 
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Figure 1: Macro-Economic Indicators - the GDP Growth Rates and Rate of Inflation between 2000 and 2010 
Moreover, the Malays were given privileges such as public sector jobs, scholarships in higher academic 
institutions and also business licenses and permits. The government intervention was considered necessary to address 
ethnic imbalances which arose from the colonial legacy and to elevate the economic positions of Malays. To overcome 
these historical injustices, government established in the 1950s the Rural and Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) 
and the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA). RIDA focused on increasing Malays participation in business by 
providing access to credits and training. FELDA initiated land reforms - i.e. to allot land to the rural poor and encourage 
the cultivation of cash crops, mainly palm oil and rubber (Gomez and Jomo, 1999:15).  
RIDA was also set up to encourage and assist the participation of Malay people in business. It aimed to develop 
entrepreneurial skills by providing initial business training and credits. In its early stages it was not very successful in 
meeting the desired goals. “In terms of enterprises initiated, credit granted and repayment experience”. (Golay et al, 
1969:366) FELDA was started in 1957 to re-distribute land to landless farmers for the cultivation and the production of 
cash crops. Nearly 250,000 hectares of lands were distributed by FELDA among the landless and small farmers between 
1957 and 1970. And 20,700 families were resettled under FELDA, which was far less than initially aimed for (Gomez and 
Jomo, 1999:15).  
Table 2 illustrates the rapidly changing sectoral contribution to GDP. During the 1960s, the government attempted 
to diversify its economy from a key focus on tin and rubber towards greater contribution of higher-valued manufactured 
goods. In 1975, the production of oil off the East Coast of the Malaysian Peninsular began and since the mid-1980s 
petroleum and gas exports to Japan have provided another lucrative source of income for the government. 
Malaysia’s Socio-Economic Transformation in Historical Perspective           27 
 
Table 2: Gross Domestic Product by Economic Activity at Constant 2000 Prices (RM Million) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Agriculture  30,647 30,594 31,471 33,369 34,929 35,835 37,701 38,177 39,828 39,992 
-0.2 2.9 6 4.7 2.6 5.2 1.3 4.3 0.4 
Mining and 
Quarrying 
37,617 36,980 38,610 40,959 42,627 42,472 42,030 42,881 41,831 40,246 
-1.7 4.4 6.1 4.1 -0.4 -1 2 -2.4 -3.8 
Manufacturing 109,998 105,301 109,640 119,687 131,127 137,940 147,154 151,257 153,171 138,809 
-4.3 4.1 9.2 9.6 5.2 6.7 2.8 1.3 -9.4 
Construction 13,971 14,427 14,762 15,031 14,903 14,685 14,639 15,707 16,366 17,321 
3.3 2.3 1.8 -0.9 -1.5 -0.3 7.3 4.2 5.8 
Services 175,649 182,821 193,500 201,568 214,528 230,043 247,099 272,406 292,555 300,153 
4.1 5.8 4.2 6.4 7.2 7.4 10.2 7.4 2.6 
GDP at 
purchaser’s 
prices 
356,401 358,246 377,559 399,414 426,508 449,250 475,526 506,341 530,181 521,095 
0.5 5.4 5.8 6.8 5.3 5.8 6.5 4.7 -1.7 
Source: Department of Statistics, Government of Malaysia, several years, Malaysia. 
In the rural sector, after independence, Malaysia did not carry out comprehensive land reforms as was done during 
the post war period in Japan (Siddiqui, 2009a) and later on in China and South Korea (Siddiqui, 2009b). However, various 
small measures were launched to promote rural cooperatives and to limit rents charged by rice land tenancy and credit 
interests. Government provided and regulated credits and encouraged investment in the agricultural sector. Government-
controlled banks were encouraged to provide credits through credit guarantees and subsidies to farmers and rural 
industries. Economic diversification has been considered an important component of the country’s economic development 
especially since the 1960s. 
After independence, the government began public investment in rural areas to undermine the influence of 
communist rebellions and also to capture votes from the rural inhabitants. The ethnic affirmative action programmes have 
contributed to lessen inter-ethnic disparities; also inflows of foreign capital in the labour intensive export sector along with 
a massive increase in the public sector by the government in the 1970s further benefited the rural inhabitants through 
increased job opportunities opened up by these government policies (Khoo, 2003).  
During the 1970s rice cultivation was overwhelmingly carried out by the Malays and large numbers of poor 
people were engaged in rice cultivation. The government aimed to improve rice cultivators’ income through productivity 
growth with the help of subsidised irrigation, chemical fertilizers, pesticides and the price support of rice. The government 
also encouraged the creation of a positive environment for the expansion of rural industries and small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) in rural areas (viii). The government also launched various programmes to benefit small farmers by 
giving subsidies and training for the cultivation of cash crops such as rubber and palm oil. These interventionist policies 
did help the rural poor and played a very positive role in the economic improvements of rural inhabitants, which happened 
to be overwhelmingly ethnic Malays. 
In mid-1980s, the government emphasised the policy of ‘looking towards East’ influenced by the experiences in 
Japan and South Korea, and targeted certain heavy industries such as petro-chemicals, steel and automobiles on the basis of 
joint ventures with significant possibilities for ‘Bumiputera’ participation into modern industrial sectors. Henderson and 
Phillips (2007) on the issue and consequences of foreign capital finds that “Unlike industrialisation experiences elsewhere 
in East Asia, FDI led industrialisation in Malaysia has not has not stimulated significant, nationally owned export 
industries. Given that local input has remained towards the lower end of the prodcution chain, there have been no ‘product-
life-cycle effects’ associated with the production strategies of TNCs themselves that might otherwise have provided 
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incentives fro local companies to upgrade to meet their requirements for higher value-added  supplies or opportunities for 
the latter to enter export markets …” (Henderson and Phillips, 2007:88).  
During the mid-1990s the government privatised of new international airports, high ways, telecommunications 
etc. There was huge expansion of export-oriented industries, coincided with rapid rise in investment in infrastructure has 
played a positive role to achieve average around 8% annually since 1988. With privatisation state assets were transferred 
into private hands at discounted prices. In Malaysia the availability of migrant workers at lower wages seems to have 
provided incentives for foreign investors to expand or maintain their utilisation of the country as a regional hub for low 
costs, labour incentives for intermediate goods and technology and also to be assembled in Malaysia. 
Malaysia’s GDP contribution by sector-wise in 1970 was the following: Agriculture contributed 40 %; mining 
and manufacturing 6 % respectively; agriculture decreased to 31 %; mining remained the same while manufacturing rose 
to 13 %. During the 1980s agricultural contribution dropped further to only 18 %, while mining rose to 10 %, the 
manufacturing sector rose to 26 %. Further in 1995, agriculture declined to 14 %, mining dropped slightly to 7 %, while 
manufacturing rose to 33%. It appears that while agriculture dropped to less that half between 1960 and 1995, mining rose 
slightly (from 6 % to 7%), manufacturing rose dramatically from just only 6 % in 1960 to 33 % in 1995. (ix) 
On the export side, agricultural commodities contributed to 66.1%, while mining and manufacturing made up 
22% and 8.5% respectively of the total exports in 1960. However, two decades later in 1980 agricultural exports declined 
to 43.6%, while mining and manufacturing rose to 33.8% and 21.6% respectively. Again in 1995 we witness export of 
agricultural products declining further to 14.2%, mining to 6.4%, while manufacturing rose to 80.2%. It also seems that the 
country was able to successfully diversify from low value agricultural commodities to medium value manufacturing 
products (x). Thus, by 1995 manufactured goods comprised more than 80% of exports. The rapid transformation of the 
Malaysian economy was mainly due to the expansion of the manufacturing sector, which heavily relied on foreign inflows 
of capital and the availability of technology and skills supplied by the rising Multi –National Corporations (MNCs).  
Table 3 indicates the share of exports of manufactured goods for the last ten years. The data shows that electronics 
and electrical machinery is the largest contributor to the total export, although it has declined but still quite large compare 
to other products. While other products such as iron and steel has increased from 22,921RM million in 2006 to 26,695 RM 
million in 2007 and further rose to 29,594RM million in 2008. In 2009 it appears due to the global financial crisis it 
declined to 22,917RM million. However, the rapid increase  
Table 3: Shows Exports of Manufactured Goods between 2006 and 2010 (RM Million) 
   2006 2007 2008 2009 20101)     %share 
Electronics, electrical 
machinery and appliances 
281,348 266,454 255,360 227,778 146,200 51.6 
Chemicals and plastic 
products 
37,716 41,572 45,531 38,239 27,110 9.6 
Petroleum Products 23,930 26,089 36,080 24,846 16,830 5.9 
Iron, Steel & Metal Products 22,921 26,695 29,594 22,917 15,457 5.5 
Machinery & Equipments 19,439 21,871 21,922 19,188 12,784 4.5 
Wood Products 14,791 14,391 14,957 12,728 8,032 2.8 
Textiles, apparel & footwear 10,925 10,631 10,911 9,375 5,446 1.9 
Other manufactured goods 56,382 61,369 71,453 62,410 45,200 16 
Source: Department of Statistics, Government of Malaysia, Malaysia.  
1) January to July 2010 
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Since the mid-1980s the Malaysian government has moved towards a process of privatisation and restructuring of 
state owned enterprises. By 1994, the state owned enterprises and industries producing automobiles, petro-chemicals, 
cements, iron and steel had been privatised.  
The New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched following the ethnic riots in 1969. The main cause identified for 
being the root cause of ethnic tensions between indigenous Malays and non-Malays, was the issue of ‘poverty’ and 
inequality. With the help of NEP policies the government aimed to reduce poverty from 49% in 1970 to 17% by 1990. 
Provisions for free education and scholarships for Malays, along with highly skilled professional training and job 
opportunities in the public sector were created. This involved a government supported initiative to target a specific 
business group who would be able to receive state aid and support. With the launching of NEP in 1971, the government 
proclaimed to be able to correct economic imbalances and eventually the removal of the problem of ethnic strife (xi) by 
using economic measures to eradicate poverty in the country.  
It appears that the adoption of NEP had meant abandoning the policy of laissez-faire policy in favour of state 
intervention. The government acted through selective patronage for a few selected industries. The government was also 
very keen to promote the investment of Malay capital. As researchers note: “Regulation to promote Bumiputera businesses 
also received a strong boost from the launching of government-sponsored heavy industries, i.e. cement (Kedah cement and 
Perak Hanjoong), steel (Perwaja steel) and motor vehicle (Proton). Despite the use of foreign-local joint venture ship, the 
bulk of the employees occupying professional positions in these organisations were Bumiputeras, which is rare in large 
privately owned manufacturing establishments. In addition by offering a generally captive domestic market through high 
tariffs and quotas, the government offered the incentives for modern Bumiputera entrepreneurship to evolve”. (Rasiah and 
Shari, 2001:73-74)  
There was an effort to shift higher value added products and services by focusing on greater specialisation through 
international linkages. The government realised that industrial upgrading requires a strong domestic base of high skills, 
infrastructure and knowledge. It also required huge investments in high tech, and research and development sectors over 
the long term. During the 1970 government encouraged Malay participation in manufacturing sector. Between 1971 and 
1981, the presence of public enterprise increased and in 1975 the government directed that each quoted firm on the stock 
market should allocate a minimum of 30% of its equity to Bumiputera. Earlier, the Chinese had dominated key modern 
sectors such as banking, property and construction. 
Prior to becoming Prime Minister, Mahathir was critical of neo-liberal economic policies, which the country 
pursued in the first decade after independence. He argued that state involvement in the economic policy is crucial to 
address the problems of economic inequalities between various ethnic groups (xii) Mahathir Mohammed became Prime 
Minister in 1981. Soon after he put forward a grand vision for Malaysian economic development, which was intended to 
help the country join the developed economies by 2020.Then the government decided to steer the general direction of the 
economy in order to expand the domestic economy. The government also encouraged Malaysian firms to establish joint 
ventures with European manufacturers for new products. The inflows of foreign capital during the 1990s contributed to the 
expansion of the manufacturing sector. However, unlike Japan and South Korea, Malaysia relied heavily relied on foreign 
capital to industrialise the country. “The government’s subscription to policies under the developmental state model, 
particularly during the more than two decades of Mahathir Mohammed’s premiership (1981-2003), has established to 
Malaysia’s fairly rapid economic development. State-led development, replicating post-war Japan’s form of economic 
growth, was imperative for Mahathir in order to support domestic enterprises and encourage the rise of large business 
groups. His desire to develop huge conglomerates was influenced strongly by East Asian corporate models, especially the 
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Japanese Zaibatsu and South Korean Chaebol, with their emphasis on the close links between the financial and industrial 
sectors to advance industrialisation.” (Gomez, 2009:348-49) 
However, the appreciation of the Japanese yen against the US dollar in 1985 as a result of the Plaza accord with 
United States resulted in an increase of Malaysian external debts denominated in Japanese yen. Under these international 
circumstances, Malaysian government allowed a depreciation of its currency the ringgit, which led to a sudden increase in 
external debts to a level of 76% of GDP in 1986.  
The Malaysian economy grew by average about 7 % over the two decades of NEP. As a result, the country’s GDP 
doubled in a decade. It is hoped that the current development programme just launched will be successful known as “vision 
2020”, it has the goal to increase GDP by 2020 to eight times larger than that in 1970. The Malaysian economy has already 
diversified considerably when compared to the 1960s, when its main industries were associated with tin and timber, which 
were main economic activities during the colonial period. In recent years petroleum and gas industries have expanded 
along with the production of more cash crops such as pepper and cocoa which have increased their export share. 
By 1990, the government replaced the NEP with the NDP (National Development Policy). The NDP proclaimed a 
grand vision of transforming the country into developed economies by 2020. The plan was to keep GDP growth rates at 
7% annually. It was suppose to be achieved with the help of the public sector, contrary to the earlier NEP where state 
played a crucial role in achieving the goals. The government also initiated privatisation and in 1985 established the 
Economic Planning Unit (EPU) to provide guidelines on privatisation policy. The government privatisation policy appears 
to have provided incentives for bureaucrats and managers of public sector corporations to make a transition to the private 
sectors.  
Ibrahim Anwar, then deputy Prime Minister was sacked immediately after the imposition of capital control in 
September 1998 as he publically disagreed with Prime Minister Mahathir regarding corporate bailouts and capital control. 
Capital control had been used as a means of lowering interest rates while at the same time reducing the pressure on the 
financial sector. There was no doubt that the capital controls and yen pegging of the ringgit were important policies 
measures, which distinguished Malaysia from other East Asian economies, who have been more deeply affected by the 
East Asian financial crisis.  
In order to regulate capital inflows, the government created the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) in 1974. The 
aim was to monitor foreign takeovers of domestic companies. But by the mid-1980s, despite the launching of NEP, the 
country’s exports still largely consisted of raw materials, though they had managed to build some heavy industries with 
state support. Then with the global commodity prices slowing down in 1986 the country witnessed a rapid fall in the prices 
of rubber and tin, which dropped by nearly half compared to 1984. However, government spending through NEP period 
remained high.  
The manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP rates remained stagnant between 1960 and 1965 and foreign 
capital inflows slowed down during this period as domestic markets witnessed stagnation. The slow growth in the 1960s 
meant worsening economic situation for the majority of the people leading towards increased frustration and tension 
between ethnic groups leading towards ethnic riots in 1969. The government launched NEP in 1970 and set out to reduce 
poverty. Ethnic wise poverty in 1970 was 74% for Malays, 39% for Indians, and 26% for Chinese. This was supposed to 
be achieved by creating more jobs in public sectors and by creating Malay entrepreneurs. The employment distribution in 
various sectors in 1970 in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors were 66.2%, 12.1%, and 21.7% respectively. The 
NEP aimed to restructure the economy with job expansion in the manufacturing sector. However, by the end of 1970s the 
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Malay ethnic group ownership of shares in major sectors of the economy was still insignificant. More than two-third 
ownership of the economy remained in foreign capital and Chinese ownership amounted to 22.5% (Gomez and Jomo, 
1999:19). 
The government ethnic policy in Malaysia was to improve the living conditions of the majority Malay people in 
response to the 1969 race riots. The government launched the New Economic Policy (NEP) with an objective to 
redistribute the wealth and economic activities from non-Malays to Malays. As a part of this strategy the government set-
up heavy industries under state ownership, known as Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM), and also 
encouraged joint-ventures with foreign partners. Proton car manufacturing is one prime example of such government 
initiative. Experiences of government initiatives were summarised by Park (2000: 239) as: “A slowing world economy had 
depressed prices for Malaysia’s major commodities to their lowest levels in thirty years, resulting in contraction of the 
domestic economy. Almost all units under HICOM went into red. Management of state industries was passed to private 
sector managers who were mostly non-Malays. These management changes indicated a new government emphasis on 
market signals and the profit criterion for evaluating state enterprise performance. HICOM management changes are by no 
means the only steps that have been taken since 1988 to reorient government industrial policy away from the earlier effort 
at state-led industrialisation. Privatization and de-nationalization have gained momentum” (Park, 2000: 239). 
For example, Malaysia’s two decades of redistribution policy has had some positive impact on the stated goals of 
achieving 30% Bumiputera. Since the adoption of the NEP unemployment had fallen from 8% in 1970 to only 2.5% in 
1996. This was achieved on the basis of market friendly policies (World Bank, 1993).  However, a number of researchers 
have found that the rapid reduction of unemployment seen under the NEP period were largely due to pro-market and 
government interventionists policies. A combination of both policies did assist to make export-based industrialisation a 
success, while at the same time government re-distributive polices, particularly in rural areas, proved to be helpful to 
address of issues of inequality. 
Adam and Cavendish (1995) concluded that “while real GDP growth had been impressive (during the last two 
decades of NEP) and the standard of living of the Bumiputeras as a whole had improved dramatically, the overall 
performance of the economy had not been outstanding by regional standards. It has been widely argued that growth was 
hampered by NEP. When it was introduced, Malaysia ranked third only to Japan and Singapore among East Asian nations 
in terms of GDP per capita; by 1990 it had fallen behind South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong as well. Had growth not 
been constrained by NEP, it is argued, the economic performance and welfare of the Bumiputera would have been even 
more greatly enhanced” (Adam and Cavendish, 1995:15). Another researcher, namely Khoo (1994) argues that the 
government acknowledged disappointment. As he notes, “Malay businessmen had been nurtured on easy credit, business 
licenses, government contracts, and other forms of preferential treatment …. They did not fulfil NEP’s vision of a class of 
competitive Malay entrepreneurs …. NEP’s restructuring appeared to have removed the racial imbalances only in form 
because in reality NEP fostered a ‘dole’, ‘subsidy’ or ‘get-rich-quick’ mentality among the Malays. State protection had 
perpetuated Malay dependence on the state” (cited in Gomez and Jomo, 1999: 118). 
The NEP’s goal of reducing poverty had been achieved by the end of 1980s. Poverty overall, for instance, 
declined from 49% in 1970 to 15% in 1989. The identification of ethnic groups with ‘occupation’ had been reduced. The 
governments’ preferential policies towards Malays did facilitate an increase in their proportion of public listed companies 
from a 2.4% share in 1970 to 19.3% in 1990. This has had a positive effect on both rural social and income mobility and 
certainly resulted in a trickledown effect. However, despite some noticeable economic changes, Bumiputera still dominate 
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agriculture and the public sector. The principal beneficiaries of government policies thus seemed to be business persons 
linked with political elites. Malays found a quick way to make money. 
The National Economic Policy also created an environment of expanded bureaucracy, economic inefficiency and 
high costs and low levels of entrepreneurship and innovations. Such businesses also lacked managerial expertise and 
therefore, it affected their decision making ability as well. As a result, decisions were taken which were not always most 
profitable. Overall, most of them relied on government support and thus were not part of the competitive market ethos. In 
the mid 1970s, Malaysia became a net oil exporter and along with higher commodities prices, the issue of fiscal discipline 
were seen as unnecessary. However, by the mid 1980s the global recession had brought the commodity prices sharply 
down, which adversely affected Malaysia’s overall export incomes. Capital flights increased and private investment fell 
sharply. Under these circumstances government reacted by investing in heavy industries such as steel, cement car etc. with 
collaboration from global corporate groups.   
Foreign capital had been displaced by the Malay during the NEP period, as it was hoped such polices would 
encourage Malay farmers to opt for cash crops cultivation. Economic growth was achieved by a structural changes 
supported by increased investment in the manufacturing sector (Kaldor, 1979), while latter growth theorists advocated for 
the creation of comparative advantages so that increasing returns to scale could be achieved (Krugman, 1980, Romer, 
1986). 
Despite the widespread literacy and availability of schools in rural areas, Malaysia still is far behind in investment 
in research and development compare to other East Asian countries in the industrial related research. However, in the 
agriculture sector, Malaysia has a long tradition of high quality research. In the area of rubber plantations, which was 
earlier owned exclusively by European capital, the Rubber Research Institute (RRI) and also Palm Oil Research have both 
achieved world class standards in R&D in these areas, which have enormously benefitted the plantation sector. Through 
the NEP the government provided various economic incentives to both import substitution and Export Oriented policies as 
regards the manufacturing sectors as well as taking a number of steps to address the issues of rural poverty and 
infrastructure. 
Neoliberal economists have pointed out the ‘invisible hand’ as the best way to allocate resources and stable 
growth. They also argue that economic activities such as production and distribution should be left on private enterprise 
with little or no state intervention in order to get the best outcomes (World Bank, 1993). The World Bank (1993) study has 
acknowledged that rapid growth and international competitiveness has been achieved as a result of economic liberalisation. 
Contrary to this, various studies not only in Malaysia, but other East Asian countries have found that there is a clear 
evidence of government intervention, which played a crucial role to achieve rapid growth rates. (Lall, 1996; Wade, 1991; 
Amsden, 1989)  
Lall (1996) has emphasised the importance of innovation and research with companies as industry matures in 
developing economies. The highly technical research and development base enables a quicker diffusion of technology 
within the economy. It also lowers the costs of transfer, strengthens diversification and the spillovers which have a further 
multiplier effect within the wider economy.  
The main objectives of the NEP were to eradicate poverty and restructure society to eliminate the wide disparity 
between races with regard to their share of economic function. The government target was to raise Malay ownership of 
share capital in private companies and the proportion of Malays employed in management positions. The government 
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stated goals were that the corporate share of Malays to be raised from 2% in 1970 to 30% by 1990 while raising 
employment in the modern sector to enable the country to reflect the racial composition of the country. 
The government established Heavy Industries Corporations of Malaysia (HICOM) in 1980 initiated partnerships 
with foreign companies to set up industries in areas such as: iron and steel, cement, paper and petrochemicals etc. These 
industries were expected to “strengthen the foundation of manufacturing sector [by providing] strong forward and 
backward linkages for the development of other industries” (Government of Malaysia, 1993). 
The East Asian crisis of 1997 had a different impact on Malaysia due to its banking sector having little exposure 
to foreign debts. This was the reason why it was able to deal with such a difficult situation without an IMF rescue package. 
However, a few months later, the government announced various austerity measures, both fiscal and monetary. The 
government introduced a capital controls policy in order to reduce capital flight associated with loosening monetary policy 
and lower interest rates. There was no negative impact, as the government clearly said that it was a short term measure. For 
the last five decades, Malaysia’s economic performance has been very impressive compared to many other developing 
countries. For instance, in South Korea and Taiwan the state took a complementary role along with the market to compel 
businesses to adopt technical and efficiency improvements. Later on in 1990s with de-regulation, tariffs and incentives 
were reduced leading domestic businesses to find it more lucrative to invest in land and estate property sectors.   
The Mahathir government had created greater power in the hands of bureaucrats and the top tier of political 
leadership through constitutional amendments. Such amendments did facilitate the implementation of NEP along with state 
involvement to reduce inter-ethnic economic disparities and privatisation of over grown and inefficient public sector. The 
mid-1990s saw the government privatisation of new international airports, high ways, and telecommunications etc. There 
was also a huge expansion of export-oriented industries, coinciding with a rapid rise in investment in infrastructure that has 
played a positive role in achieving an average growth of around 8% annually since 1988; but alongside this went the 
privatisation of state assets that were transferred into private hands at discounted prices.  
ECONOMIC POLICY AND INFLOW OF CAPITAL  
Malaysia has been quite successful in attracting huge amounts of foreign inflows of capital (FDI). The data 
published by UNCTAD (2004) indicates that Malaysia has become the most popular destination in Asia for foreign capital. 
The policy reforms, including: the introduction of Investment Incentives Act of 1968; the establishment of free trade zones 
in the early 1970s; and the provisions of export incentives alongside the acceleration of open policy in 1986, led to a surge 
of FDI inflows into Malaysia. It is also said the availability of skilled labour force helped contribute to attract foreign 
capital into the country. 
Since the early 1960s the country had tried to attract foreign capital through small incentives such as lower tariffs 
on final goods and by strict control on trade unions. Moreover government banned trade union activities in export sectors, 
particularly in textiles, electrical and manufacturing.  
However, with the Plaza Accord of 1985, a rapid increase in foreign capital inflows to South East Asian countries 
took place, with Malaysia becoming but just one of the major beneficiaries of the external changes. For instance, Malaysia 
stood second only to Singapore in terms of receiving foreign investments. There is no doubt, however, that foreign capital 
did contribute towards a transformation of the economy. For example, the output share of agriculture in GDP fell from 
21% in 1985 to 12% from 185 to 1997, while during the same period, the share of manufacturing rose from 20% to 36%. 
More significantly the government succeeded in diversifying the economy and the manufacturing sector was able to 
successfully upgrade its production. The share of value-addition in manufacturing moved away from agricultural based 
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low-value food processing activities to higher-value more capital intensive production. It is generally accepted that a 
mature technological base is propelled by vibrant and innovative research and development activities. However, contrary 
to this Malaysia’s rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector was not achieved with a similar increase in indigenous 
research activities. This led to many researchers questioning the long-term sustainability of the manufacturing sector. 
Until 1993, foreign investment contributed 60% of all investment in Malaysia. FDI grew strongly in the late 
1980s to reach a peak of RM17.7 billion in 1992. Figure 2 indicates the difference of capital inflows in the region. China 
receives the highest foreign capital investment followed by Singapore. Within the developing countries China, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia received a significant amount of the share of developing world’s foreign capital 
inflows. Among the developing countries, the top 10 countries received 64 % of the total FDI in 2006. 
 
This was followed by a sharp drop to RM6 billion in 1993 due to the world recession, but rose again to RM15.2 
billion in 1994. Malaysia is among the top five recipients of foreign direct investment in the world. Japan and Taiwan are 
clearly the largest overall investors with the US third, followed by France, Singapore and the UK (McLeman 1994, 19).  
 
Figure 3: FDI Inflows in Malaysia (Million US$) 
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Malaysia, perhaps, represents one of the most successful developing nations that has been able to effectively 
incorporate economic policy objectives with foreign funds, knowledge and networking through FDI. The inflow of foreign 
capital in Malaysia is therefore an important catalytic factor; increasing exports, knowledge and providing an economic 
vehicle towards the Malaysian 2020 vision.  
Among other government policies intended to promote the development of business culture among Malay people 
was the allowing of quotas imposed in public sector employment, business licenses and scholarships to higher academic 
institutions. By following these policies, government aimed to create and expand Malay owned businesses. Malays were 
generally given various supports to facilitate their entry into modern businesses.  
In the late 1960s, the government abandoned ISI policies and starting advocating export oriented industrialisation 
(EOI). To facilitate this in 1968 the Employment and Export Oriented Investment Incentives Act was introduced, which 
offered tax holidays to approved firms of up to a maximum of 8 years. Exemptions were also given from import duties of 
technologies and raw materials for export oriented industries. However, domestic producers were protected through a new 
tariff zolicy on imported consumer goods.  
Under Free Trade Zone Act of 1971, the free trade zones of manufacturing were set up to receive FDI. These 
export zones were given all possible incentives to attract foreign capital, technology and management to produce for 
overseas markets. By the early 1980s these industries overtook Malaysia’s manufactured exports. These foreign companies 
however, were not under any pressure from the government to set up joint ventures with domestic firms unless they 
produce for domestic markets (Jomo and Edwards, 1993) 
Despite some industrialisation, the over dependence of rubber, tin and palm oil was seen continuing until 1969. 
For example, the major export items in 1956 in percentage terms such as rubber, tin, timber and palm oil were 63, 17, 2 
and 2% respectively, while it changed to 44, 25, 5 and 4% in 1969 (Lim, 1973: 122). Despite the fall in the prices of 
rubber, these primary commodities still accounted for nearly 80% of total gross export earnings of the country. The effects 
of the free trade export zone were limited as it was largely located in the urban areas. 
The situation of South Korea’s economic development is remarkable. The country, which had a per capita income 
lesser than that of the Philippines in 1965, could by 1995 boast a per capita income of US$ 13,269 compared to that of the 
Philippines of only US$ 2,475. This is an increase of 770% in just three decades (Ahuja, 1997) Unlike Indonesia, South 
Korea’s industrialisation path was based mainly on mobilising domestic savings which was partly due to rural reform of 
the 1950s. Foreign capital however, did play a part in development of the manufacturing sector in Singapore. The 
government did manage to build a close relationship between state and private sector. It adopted the policy of ‘choosing 
strategic sectors and industries’, providing them with subsidized credits through government directed banking system - at 
the same time protecting them from foreign competition and these Chaebol later on were pushed international markets. 
However, in early 1980 inefficiency and corruption in the Chaebol, banks and government was becoming obvious. By 
mid-1990s it became more critical, which was mainly due to government’s inability to invest significantly in research and 
development; to join OECD membership, which led to the adoption of more liberal policies towards foreign capital. South 
Korean big business rather than investing in R&D invested in real estate and stock markets. By the 1990, there were only 
32 engineers per 10,000 workers in South Korea compared to 240 in Japan and 160 in the US. Most of the high technology 
was imported from Japan, which led to massive trade deficit with Japan. While at the same time, competition in global 
markets from other East Asian countries cheap labour put increased pressures on South Korea. 
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Initially, Malaysia hoped to attract local businesses to invest in heavy industries, but it proved to not be very 
successful. Local businesses were reluctant to invest because of the massive capital investment and long gestation period 
that was required. Therefore, government encouraged foreign investors and brought in the Investment Protection Act in 
1986, which provided generous tax holidays for a period of five to ten years. During the 1980s the international financial 
institutions advocated de-regulation to reduce government spending, cut down red tapes and finally, provide for a greater 
role of private enterprises in the economy. 
In the late 1960s, the government abandoned ISI policies and starting advocating export oriented industrialisation 
(EOI). To facilitate this in 1968 Employment and Export Oriented Investment Incentives Act was introduced, which 
offered tax holidays to approved firms of maximum 8 years. Exemptions were also given from import duties of 
technologies and raw materials for export oriented industries. However, domestic producers were protected through new 
tariff policy on imported consumer goods.  
On the question of the benefits of the privatisation, Kirkpatrick (1993) has critically observed that effective use of 
resources by the public sector, rather than its size should be the measure of its performance. For instance, in South Korea 
and Taiwan the public sector has performed efficiently. He also suggested that privatisation does not necessarily provide a 
solution to inefficiencies associated with the public sector. Privatisation may lead to reduced fiscal deficits as well as it 
may lead to the state selling off its assets too cheaply. In Malaysia nepotism did take place due to the absence of an 
independent monitoring body. 
Experiences of government initiatives were summarised by Park (2000: 239) as: “A slowing world economy had 
depressed prices for Malaysia’s major commodities to their lowest levels in thirty years, resulting in contraction of the 
domestic economy. Almost all units under HICOM went into red. Management of state industries was passed to private 
sector managers who were mostly non-Malays. These management changes indicated a new government emphasis on 
market signals and the profit criterion for evaluating state enterprise performance. HICOM management changes are by no 
means the only steps that have been taken since 1988 to reorient government industrial policy away from the earlier effort 
at state-led industrialisation. Privatization and de-nationalization have gained momentum”. (Park, 2000: 239) 
THE PROMOTION OF MALAY CAPITALISM 
In the early 1980s, the government increased emphasis on ‘Import Substitution’ with an aim to protect certain 
industries, such as steel, aluminium, cement, chemicals etc. However, by 1985 the government began to promote an Export 
Oriented policy. The question arises as to why the government changed its policy? It seems that the policies of early 1980s 
to favour domestic industries did not create rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector. The achievements were far below 
expectations. The country witnessed an economic crisis in 1985 and to overcome this situation, it was decided to take a u-
turn and to adopt an Export Oriented policy.  
In 1985 the prices of primary commodities declined sharply due to global recession, resulting in the rapid decline 
of export revenues. Also public and private expenditures were reduced. The cumulative effects of all these factors led to a 
negative GDP growth rate of -1.1% in 1985. Therefore, the government decided to encourage foreign capital inflows with 
the hope that foreign companies would increase investment and economic activity and thus boost the domestic economy. 
The government took a further initiative and changed the rules to allow 100% foreign ownership of capital for companies 
which exported more than 50% of their products in 1986, reduced from 80% which was the previous requirement. During 
the mid-1980s, the inflows of foreign capital were stagnant, but after the change in foreign ownership rules and along with 
fiscal incentives the FDI rose sharply by the late 1980s. At the same time the country also witnessed an increase in the 
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share of export in the total production of manufacturing from 36.5% to 50% between 1985 and 1990. It is widely accepted 
that the export sector played a positive role towards achieving overall high GDP growth rates. Within the manufacturing 
sector, for example, electronic and electrical machinery industries but also plastic, furniture and industrial output rose 
dramatically. 
When Mahathir became prime minister in 1981, the country had witnessed a rapid change in the ownership 
patterns; the government appeared to be committed to facilitating the development of capitalism, especially among the 
ethnic Malays. Mahathir Mohammed prior to becoming prime minister was already advocating for greater government 
roles through encouraging Malays participation in top businesses (Mahathir, 1981). In 1981, the government setup the 
Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) and increased the country’s heavy industrial activity. With this the 
government aimed to build a capital goods industry with close linkages to Bumiputera enterprises. The rapidly growing 
manufacturing sector provided employment to the female workforce, thus reducing poverty and inequality. 
The collapse of the asset price bubble had been encouraged by the policy of financial liberalisation. Jomo (1998) 
argues that financial interests and financial liberalisation led to an overvalued currency, which ultimately had adverse 
macroeconomic consequences. “Bumiputera-controlled conglomerates emerged, usually with the patronage of powerful 
politicians, e.g. in the form of soft loans from state-owned banks and the award of major projects and licenses as well as 
other lucrative business opportunities. The ownership of financial institutions as well as top corporations by the 
government and by the state owned enterprises and later, the privatisation of some of them, served to encourage such 
developments. Huge loans could be obtained without going through proper procedures, and were often given for 
speculative get-rich-quick schemes, rather than for productive investments”. (Jomo, 1998:709) 
During later half of the 1980s, Malaysia accelerated its trade liberalisation policy. The electronic industry had 
been upgrading and shifting towards a higher value added products and services through international link. Also of critical 
importance was the ability to bring in at short notice specialists from abroad who were required to fill the knowledge gap. 
It appears that both the reintegration of geographically dispersed production sites into integrated global production 
networks and the use of IT systems to management, encouraged a diffusion of knowledge and new technology. 
Ethnic based positive discrimination, despite creating crony interests, did however contribute towards poverty 
reduction and helped to create more political stability. Through preferential government policies, the government provided 
employment to Malays in the public sector and also encouraged greater participation in the manufacturing sector, thereby 
taking concrete measures to restructure the occupational demographics of ethnicity.  
Gomez and Jomo (1997) argue that this patronage has figured prominently in the awarding of privatised projects, 
with major beneficiaries of state assets being Bumiputera companies where owners were closely connected to UMNO. The 
privatisation, particularly of infrastructure projects occurred where the contract was awarded to party members, especially 
those close to the UMNO. As Yoshihara (1999) argues, “If Malaysian businessmen want to be successful they have to be 
close to UMNO leaders because those leaders influence the way business games are played in the country. If they have 
good connections, they can win by participating in games where the outcomes are largely pre-determined. The trouble with 
this arrangement is that those who are successful, are good political entrepreneurs but often, poor businessmen” 
(Yoshihara, 1999:17).Moreover, the state controlled banks were quite willing to provide loans to those who were well 
connected to the ruling party to purchase formerly public sector companies.  
The availability of abundant of natural resources in Malaysia made possible rapid GDP rates based on this 
primary sector and thus may have weakened the focus on the need to industrialise and encourage the export growth sectors. 
38      Kalim Siddiqui 
 
Being resource rich is bad for growth. The natural resource is seen by some as a “resource curse”, weakening the motive to 
industrialisation (Sachs, 1997). Contrary to such perceptions, Malaysia has successfully diversified the range of their 
primary exports and later on the government encouraged the development of processing capacities to increase value-added. 
However, such development was only possible due to government support to make this happen.   
At first economic diversification took place in other primary products. However, as a broader strategy this may 
prove difficult in small resource rich countries whose natural resource endowment is more likely to be skewed towards the 
production of one commodity, as seen with such examples as oil producing countries of the Gulf region (Hesse, 2008; Al-
Kawaz, 2008; Rodrik, 2006: Rodrik, 2005). There are a number of studies which have focused on this ‘resource curse’ 
(also known as ‘issues and supply of the abundance of natural resources on development’) and how this curse could be 
overcome. This is also termed as the ‘Dutch disease’, whereby a resource boom leads to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate that may work negatively against manufacturing and other export sectors.  
Historically, to begin with economic diversification tended to take place in primary production. It involved 
various combinations of policy initiatives - for instance, the expansion of new industries were encouraged, especially if 
they focus on production for foreign markets. Also in the agricultural sector, government sponsored research was aimed at 
higher productivity to help farmers. It was thanks to this government help that by the 1980s the country had became the 
world’s largest producer of palm oil, cocoa and pepper, while losing the world’s leading role that it previously had in the 
production of tin and rubber.  
However, this may prove difficult in small resource rich countries whose large natural resource endowment is 
more likely to be skewed towards the production of one commodity such as oil producing countries of the Gulf region 
(Hesse, 2008; Al-Kawaz, 2008; Rodrik, 2006: Rodrik, 2005). There are a number of studies (as seen above), which have 
focused on ‘resource curse’ also known as issues and supply of abundant of natural resources on development and how this 
curse could be overcome. This is also termed as ‘Dutch disease’, whereby a resource boom leads to a appreciation of the 
real exchange rate and that may work negatively against manufacturing and other export sectors. They mean to say the 
resource abundant countries have performed poorly in the overall economic development.  
Anne Krueger (1980) has pointed out that natural resources could help a country to make the transition from less 
developed to developed country. While others have criticised such views and argue that the nature of international 
commodity markets put less developed countries who rely on their natural resource exports at a disadvantage (Prebisch, 
1950; Rodrik, 2003). It is true that most of the findings do support the above view, but evidence is by no means conclusive. 
For instance, most abundant resource developing countries such as Congo, Nigeria, Zambia, Ivory Coast, and many 
Central American countries have performed worst, but some such as Malaysia, Norway, Australia and Canada have 
performed very well and used natural resources to advance their economies (Stevens, 2003). Stevens (2003) states that “the 
resource curse suggest that the main problem with natural resource abundance is not that it leads to economic dependence 
on natural resources or a skewed export structure per se but that it creates rents – that is, excess earning above normal 
profits” (Stevens, 2003:10-11). The existence of these rents are seen as negatively contributing to development and 
encouraging political and social elites towards rent seeking behaviour and thus likely to undermine growth promoting 
polices.  
In 1998, Malaysia experienced a recession. To fight this recession government introduced capital control 
measures to minimise capital flight and stop foreign portfolio investors from withdrawing their funds for at least a year. 
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The Export sector is dominated by foreign capital and between 1985 and 1990 the FDI flowing into Malaysia rose by 
almost 400% from US$ 0.69 billion to US$ 2.33 billion with even further increases to US$ 5.18 in 1992.  
‘ASIAN MODEL’ – DEBATE 
It is important to briefly look at the growth experiences and strategies in the East Asia. South Korea and Taiwan 
provided protection to domestic infant industries in return for stringent performance (Amsden, 1989; Change, 1991) 
However, Malaysia offered monopoly rents to both domestic and foreign corporate businesses without performance 
conditions 
Malaysia always had low protection tariffs compare to other East Asian countries, which were further reduced 
(except automobiles). For instance, the average rate of tariff protection of manufacturing was 25% in 1961, increasing to 
70% in 1971, and then declining to 30% in 1989. However, in the late 1990s with the financial crisis and the collapse of 
the asset price bubble had been encouraged by the financial liberalisation.  
Figure 4 indicates that fixed capital formation in percentage of GDP has been quite high compared to other East Asian 
economies. 
 
Figure 4: Gross Fixed Capital Formation (In % of GDP) 
The Table 4 below indicates the average GDP growth rates of the East Asian countries. Sectoral shares could also 
be seen below. Malaysia’s percentage of GDP in manufacturing sector is lower than South Korea and Taiwan, but higher 
than Indonesia and Thailand. Table 5 shows Malaysia is quite high in term of life expectancy compared to other 
countriesxiii. In 2007, 98% children were enrolled in the primary education, which is a remarkable achievement in a 
developing country and its debt service is also quite low i.e. 4.6 % in 2009. 
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Table 4: Economic Indicators of East Asian Economies 
Country Average annual GDP growth (%) 
Manufacturing GDP share 
(%) Agriculture/GDP Service/GDP 
  1970-80 1985-95 1970 1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995 
South Korea 10.1 7.7 21 29 27 15 7 45 50 
Taiwan 10 7.5 3.5 - 42 - - - - 
Malaysia 7.9 5.7 12 21 33 22 13 40 44 
Thailand 7.1 8.4 16 22 29 23 11 48 49 
Indonesia 7.2 6 10 13 24 24 17 34 41 
Source: World Bank, 1997, Table 12, 13, 15. 
Table 5: East Asia’s Regional Data, 2009 
  
Population GNI Per Capita 
Life 
Expectancy 
At Birth 
Primary 
Education 
Completion 
Rate 
Total Debt 
Services 
  Millions 2007 GNPa PPPb Years 2007 % of relevant 
age 2007 
% of export 
2007 
East Asia & Pacific 1,912 2,182 4,969 72 98 4 
South Asia 1,522 880 2,532 64 80 12.9 
Latin America and Caribbean  561 5,801 9,678 73 98 16 
Middle East and North Africa 313 2,820 7,402 70 90 5.8 
Sub-Sahara Africa 800 951 1,869 51 60 5 
Selected Economies       
China 1,318 2,370 5,420 73 98 2.2 
Indonesia 226 1,650 3,570 71 99 10.5 
Malaysia 27 6,420 13,230 74 98 4.6 
Philippines 68 1,620 3,710 72 94 13.7 
Thailand 64 3,400 7,880 71 100 8.1 
Vietnam 85 770 2,530 74 -- 2.3 
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 2010. a) GNP average per capita. b) Purchasing power 
parity. 
Government spending on the social sector is relatively low in Southeast Asian economies compared to the average 
in OECD countries. Social spending includes spending on social programmes like social insurance, labour market 
programmes, child protection etc. Increases in social expenditure such as health and education could increase private 
consumption by reducing the needs to self-insure to finance possible future expenditure areas. This will lead to higher 
human capital investment, thus long term growth rates. Malaysia social spending is higher than other developing countries 
(see Table 6). Malaysia has done well on poverty alleviation issue as shown in Table 7. 
Table 6: Social Spending (In % of GDP) 
  Pension 
2010 
Health 
2010 
Education 
2007 
China 2.2 2.2 1.9 
India 1.7 0.9 3.2 
Indonesia 0.9 1.3 3.5 
Malaysia 2.9 2.9 4.5 
Singapore 0.6 1 3.2 
Thailand 0.8 1.6 4.9 
Philippines 1.1 1.4 2.6 
Vietnam 1.6 1.5 5.3 
Source: OECD; IMF; UNESCO  
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 Prior to 1997 East Asian crisis, Malaysia’s GDP growth was among the highest in the world. Unlike other South 
East Asian countries, the crisis did not force Malaysia to seek IMF support. To minimise the impact of the crisis, the 
government introduced capital control as part of its crisis management policy in September 1998 (Doraisami, 2005). It was 
seen as an effective way to stabilise the economy, which was facing severe external crisis. This measure coincided with the 
worst contraction ever seen of GDP in 1998. Malaysia has done remarkably well on the poverty alleviation issue as shown 
in the figure below. 
Table 7: Poverty and Inequality Indicators 
  Population 
Living Below 
$1 Per Day, 
1990-2005 
Income Share 
of Highest 
Decile,           
2004-2005 
Income Share 
of  Lowest 
Decile 
China 34.9 34.9 1.6 
India 80.4 31.1 3.6 
Indonesia 52.4 32.3 3 
Malaysia 9.3     
Thailand 25.2 33.4 2.7 
Philippines 43 34.2 2.2 
OECD   24.2 3.1 
Source: OECD, 2009: Paris  
After the East Asian crisis in 1997, neoliberal economic reforms were imposed in many countries in the region. 
These austerity measures were meant to open up their domestic markets, to carry out financial reforms, liberalisation, 
privatisation and introduce flexibility in to labour markets. These reforms also meant to reduce the role of state in the 
economy and expand the role of the market. In return the IMF and World Bank have provided financial assistance to the 
crisis affected countries.  
Ever since the colonisation of the developing countries the liberalisation of international trade and the free flow of 
foreign capital have been witnessed. However, there is something distinctive about the current phase of globalisation and 
that is the splitting up of production across countries. The production is split across national borders. As Dickens (1998) 
emphasises that production activities are being spread in various countries, which was not seen in the earlier phase of the 
internationalisation of economic activities across national borders. This spread of economic activities both within the firms 
and across the nations has been studied by various researchers (Blair, 2009). Also, in many other East Asian countries, it is 
not the whole product but only specific parts of the production process of the products that occur within countries. For 
instance, with MNEs such as Nike, Gap etc. their labour intensive segments (e.g. cut and stitch of the clothing industry) 
have been located in East Asian countries, but other segments of production such as design and marketing, considered the 
most important tasks, are is located in the developed countries.  
The splitting of production activities is also described variously as a commodity chain, value chain, and 
production networks. These have a common characteristic where trade is not carried out in complete goods, but rather in 
particular segments or tasks. In manufacturing for instance such tasks are not confined to shoes and garments, but also 
include IT, hardware and automobiles. Apple computers, for example, focus on production design, architecture and 
operating system, while detailed design of components, assembly etc. is left to their suppliers. The auto firms also focus on 
design, new models, while leaving subcontractors to supply various manufacturing components. By splitting up activities 
across the countries, firms can to take advantage of cost differentiation without sacrificing the gains from specialisation. 
The specialisation of by a number of small suppliers often leads to further increasing returns (Sturgeon and Gereffi, 2009). 
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For example, when Indian software firms specialise on R&D outsourcing they are able to utilise the economies of scale 
from performing similar services to many separate customers (Siddiqui, 2010).  
The advantages seem to be that manufacturers based in developing countries do not have to go out and market 
their own brand, search for markets etc., but rather rely on the leading firms based in the developed countries for the above 
task. We should note that these tasks are quite impossible for the firms in developing countries when in an early stage of 
their manufacturing development. 
The economic logic of setting up production activities in different countries based on a division of labour was 
seen as a new phase of development. Ozawa’s well known Japanese formulation of “flying geese” for development 
(Ozawa, 2009). In the East Asian region it was Japan the most industrially developed nation, which was seen by others as 
leading the geese. In the first quarter of the 20th century, Japan’s rapid manufacturing growth demanded raw materials from 
the colonies and it served as a growth base for Korea and Taiwan. It locked these countries into division of labour where 
manufacturing was carried out in the leading country and raw materials production in the follower countries. It is argued 
that the lead goose (Japan) develops the technology and manufacturing sectors, with the followers (South Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan) supposed to manage the coordination of production in labour intensive commodities and also produce 
some technology intensive products. The splitting-up of production between a number of firms that also are located in 
different countries has now become an important features of the global production networks. For instance, Japanese auto 
firms concentrate on the production of diesel engines in Malaysia, while the final assembly is done in Thailand.  
Japan and South Korea followed more active industrial polices than those of Malaysian and Indonesia. Here the 
state played a stronger role to mobilise and allocate resources for national economic development. Japan has the longest 
industrial development in East Asia, where the state has played a crucial role to develop a modern industrial sector since 
the Meiji period from 1868. Contrary to this example, most countries in Southeast Asia do not have a strong indigenous 
bureaucracy such as that found in Japan. For instance Malaysia relied increasingly on market forces to determine the 
successful outcomes of their companies (Park, 2000).   
Also, both Japan and South Korea in their periods of rapid industrial expansion relied less on foreign capital 
because they feared that substantial foreign ownership may undermine the government influence and control over the 
economy. (Siddiqui, 2009a) They adopted a more cautious and restrictive policy towards foreign capital and thus this 
factor played a less important role compared to later developments in Malaysia and Singapore. The governments in Japan 
and South Korea restricted foreign ownership including ceilings on foreign capital investment in certain sectors while at 
the same time providing various fiscal incentives in favour of joint ventures as opposed to full foreign ownership (Siddiqui, 
2009a). Furthermore, both countries preferred to import technology through licensing agreements rather than through the 
entry of foreign companies into their domestic markets.  
Further, Japan and South Korea prioritised export led growth policies, but at the same time also protected 
domestic markets and encouraged domestic research and technical capabilities of the local firms. These countries did not 
follow open economic policies but initially in the post war period adopted a policy of import substitution. But once their 
companies became internationally competitive, they then pursued export oriented policies. Japan and South Korea in their 
periods of rapid industrial expansion relied less on foreign capital because they feared that substantial foreign ownership 
may undermine the government influence and control over the economy.  
However, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Hong Kong had no clear policies to support domestic 
research and development capabilities. These countries relied much more on foreign technology and money than did Japan 
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and South Korea. Their greater reliance on foreign capital and technology obviously raises questions about the 
sustainability of their industrialisation and economic growth. For instance, in Malaysia and Indonesia foreign capital 
accounted for 15% and 25% of the gross domestic capital formation respectively. Compared to this, the foreign capital 
inflows have been less than 2% in Japan and South Korea - i.e. little dependence on foreign capital for their 
industrialisation. In the case of Malaysia, the significant role played appears to be due to the specific situation in the early 
1970s, where the government hoped that foreign capital and businesses could play a balancing act of empowering ethnic 
Malays against an ethnic Chinese dominance of the economy.  
The opening of financial markets of the East Asian countries to for foreign capital was expected to increase the 
inflow of capital, but once they perceived the crisis to be deepening, the foreign capital instead flowed out at even greater 
speed, causing a currency collapse and panic that would adversely affect the whole economy.  
It is often argued that the East Asian financial crisis has dealt a severe blow to the Japanese model of state-
assisted capitalism that has been copied in varying degrees by the East Asian countries since the post-war. The key features 
of this model are an interventionist state; the disciplined market; protected domestic demand, and protection of domestic 
industries against foreign competitors. It was said that the state-business partnership was the ‘core’ of the ‘Asian model’, 
and is the main cause of the on-going recession in Japan. State supported capitalism in Japan and later on in other East 
Asian economies may have helped to achieve high GDP growth rates but would be less relevant in the recent era of 
globalization. Shinyasu Hoshino, President of National Institute for Research Advancement, Tokyo, summarised Japanese 
post-war economic experience as: “the post-war Japanese approach was something close to a planned economy, not true 
capitalism, but capitalism under strict control …Non-transparent methods such as the Japanese government’s 
administrative guidance would have been regarded as ‘unfair’ outside of Japan and most likely would not function in the 
United States. In American model, emphasis is placed on the method of competition among equal powerful industries, 
while Japan has been emphasising an industrial policy of shifting comparative advantage” (Hoshino, 1992:22). 
ISLAM AND CAPITALISM 
Islam, as religion, is seen today as anti-development, against business and entrepreneurship and considered by 
many to hold back economic development. The limits on what women are allowed to do keep wastes the talents of half of 
the population. Poorly educated mother could be hardly any model for their children (xiv).However, such a view overlooks 
the lack of social hierarchy, and its historical respect for business and trade; Prophet Mohammed was himself a merchant 
(xv). They also ignore the fact that Arab countries had strong legal traditions during the 9th and 10th centuries - i.e. long 
before Europe even developed a legal system. For example, Arabs had trained judges’ centuries before the practice was 
adopted by European countries. During the 9th and 10th centuries Arabian cultures were also centres of world science and 
mathematics (Algebra, geometry) and medicine. Back then Islam was seen as pro-development and pro-business. Even as 
late as the 13th century in Europe the Arabs were seen as more tolerant of science, supported research and were seen as 
great centres of world learning. 
The corporate form during the 13th and 14th century witnessed an expansion of scale of enterprise, but the 
dominant form by far was the commenda or single-venture agreement in which the investor (the capitalist) advanced the 
capital to the second party (the merchant) to be used in overseas commercial ventures with profits are shared as according 
to terms agreed earlier. Islamic commercial law and business practice knew both commenda agreements (mudaraba qirad) 
and investment partnerships (mufawada). Udovitch (1970) finds that the partnership and commenda law are already 
included in the Hanafite legal compendium. Overseas trade was firmly supported by the ruling classes in the Islamic world, 
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with Muslim traders making a powerful contribution to the growth of early capitalism in Mediterranean countries that 
expanded the nascent monetary economy.  
There is a need to examine this situation further to find out whether what the Muslim religion prescribes has had 
the effect of favouring or hindering those practices which are vital parts of the capitalist mode of production. The Quran 
has said nothing against private property and has even laid down rules for such things as inheritance. The birth place of 
Islam, Mecca, was a flourishing centre of trade at that time. The traders in the city made higher returns through trade and 
loans at interest; what one would call it rational behaviour. By buying and selling products the traders simply aimed to 
increase their capital. In Egypt, for instance, throughout the early Middle Ages period a large scale textile industry 
flourished. There were over 5000 looms and the industry was often carried out by workers in their own homes. Cairo had 
around 15,000 day labourers without any means of production, possessing only their labour power. As Rodinson (1980) 
points out “how a mainly commercial bourgeoisie took shape in Muslim world from the second century AH onwards (718-
815), attained an important social position, won the respect of the other strata of society as well as their own by causing 
their activities to be accepted as respectable and praiseworthy, imposing the values that were bound up with these 
activities, during the third century (815-912), and became a socio-economic factor of the highest important (912-1009). 
And yet this bourgeoisie consciousness as it was of itself never achieved political power as a class, even though many of its 
individual members succeeded in occupying the highest appointments in the state” (Rodinson, 1980:55).  
Capitalist orders of this type, which co-existed with subsistence production and with the non-monetary circuits 
predominant in that era were witnessed in early Muslim countries. The development had made possible regional 
specialisation in industry and also in agriculture, bringing about economic interdependence. It seems that private capital 
played a greater part compared with the part played by state that was during the Roman Empire. Within the common 
market and formed by the Muslim countries production and trading activities were apparently highly developed and pre-
date the establishment of the world market created by the Western European bourgeoisie: “If the bourgeoisie did not 
maintain and develop the strength it possessed in the first centuries AH, if the states dominated by hierarchy of nobles and 
soldiers prevented it from exercising sufficient weight in relation to political power; if the town did not succeed in 
acquiring sufficient domination over the countryside; if manufacturing capital did not develop on the same scale as in 
Europe or Japan; if primitive accumulation of capital never attained the European level – all this was due to factors quite 
other than Muslim religion” (Rodinson, 1980:57).  
CONCLUSIONS 
The study finds that in Malaysia the state has played an active role in creating a positive environment for 
businesses. Various steps taken in the field of agriculture through modest land reforms and helping poor peasants with land 
and credits did help the rural community. The government policy of positive discrimination also known as ‘Bumiputera’ 
did reverse the colonial legacy and built a positive role in creating more balance ethnic harmony. Contrary to what the 
mainstream economists believe our study found that rapid growth rates took place not due to market friendly policies, but 
with the government intervention in the economy. In fact, the government initiated a number of reforms to protect local 
industries and business. Malaysian government has placed the highest priority on export-oriented investments in the 
manufacturing sector. Moreover, Malaysia with a multi-ethnic population and past ethnic tension that has done relatively 
well during the last two decades, may provide important lessons for other developing countries.The 1997 the East Asian 
crisis affected Malaysia in various ways. The country’s currency the ringgit depreciated sharply which led to an enormous 
increase in capital flights. All these developments led to serious differences in policy matters between then country’s Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohammed and his Deputy Anwar Ibrahim.  
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However, the Malaysian experience of import liberalisation is different when compared to Latin American 
countries such as Mexico and Chile. In Malaysia trade liberalisation was adopted gradually and also export-oriented 
policies were implemented at the very moment import liberalisation was being launched. 
Export-led growth since 1986 has been followed by a construction and a property boom, fuelled by the financial 
sector looking to invest in short-term (xvi). During the mid 1980s in general the developing countries experienced a series of 
interlinked problems, which started with the deteriorating prices of their exports, then the debt crisis and finally the 
abandoning of ‘Import-Substitution’ policies. This was replaced by ‘neoliberal economic’ policies with the launching of 
the WTO in 1995 to provide greater freedom for multinational companies.  
It seems that the primary basis of capitalist industrialisation for Malaysia is the dependence on foreign capital. 
The countries have witnessed unprecedented growth and structural transformation in the last few decades. The average 
growth rates for the region were 6-7 % for nearly the last four decades. The manufacturing sector played an important role 
and proved to be a major contributor of the growth. Also exports rose steadily leading towards rising income levels. We 
also find that during the same period the proportion of primary commodities as a percentage of the total exports fell 
sharply, while the proportion of high value products such as machinery, electric goods, transport equipments etc. rose 
sharply. However, the study finds that new developments such as globalisation and the expansion of export sectors as seen 
in China and Vietnam will most likely bring a new dimension of competition and challenges for growing export sectors in 
particular and economic growth in general in the near future.  
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i) For instance see Alavi (1987); Bach (1975); Crouch (1996); Gomez (2004); Jomo (1998); Teik (2003); Ozawa (2009); 
Verma  (2002).  
ii) Peninsula Malaysia consist of eleven states on the mainland, and two other states are Sabah and Sarawak are located on 
the Island of Borneo about 500 miles across the south China sea from the Peninsula. 
iii) For another region (i.e. Central America) about the experiences on export of agricultural commodities see Kalim 
Siddiqui, 1998. 
iv) Bumiputera means in Malay language sons of the soil and also generally taken to refer to the indigenous people. 
v) See the World Bank Report, 2005. Also see Williamson, 1990.   
vi) For critique see Chang (1994). 
vii) For detail see Alec Gordon, 2004, pp. 371-378. 
viii) Rice is a staple food, which accounts for three-fourth of the grain consumption in Malaysia. 
ix) See Economic Report (various issues), Ministry of Finance, Government of Malaysia: Kula Lumpur  
x) See Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report (various issues) 
xi) Malaysia is a multiracial nation, the indigenous i.e. ethnic Malays also known as Bumiputera (“sons of the soil”), while 
on the other hand the Chinese and Indian are known as non-Bumiputera. Of Malaysia’s total population of 27 millions in 
2010 (see World Bank, World Development Indicators - Last updated April 2, 2011. Out of this 58.2 % were Malay, 31.3 
% Chinese, 9.8 % Indian and 0.6 % others. 
xii) Mahathir Mohammed spoke about Malay issues prior to becoming Prime Minister (e.g.1970). 
xiii) See Siddiqui, 2011 and 2010 
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xiv) See Rachel McCleary and Robert Barro (2003) on their analysis of the world value survey data  
xv) As a consequence Islam has a highly developed on the issue of contracts – even at wedding ceremonies marriage 
contract are signed between spouses. Moreover, there are emphasis on rational thinking and learning. The prophet 
Mohammed famously said that “the ink f the scholar is more sacred than the blood of the martyr”. 
xvi) Financial liberalisation is described a situation where investors have a choice as to when they “come and go”. For 
more detail see John Eatwell (1997).  
